Scientific findings involve description, and description requires measurements on the dimensions descriptive of the phenomena described. The richer a description the more multidimensional is the abstract space in which that description in effect locates what is described. Many of the dimensions of human psychological phenomena, including those of psychotherapy, are naturally gradated only ordinally. So descriptions of these phenomena locate them in merely ordinal hyperspaces, which imposes severe constraints on data analysis for inducing or testing explanatory theory involving them. Therefore, it is important to be clear about what these constraints are and so what properly can be concluded on the basis of ordinal-scale multivariate data, which also provides a test for methods that are proposed to transform ordinal-scale data into ratio-scale data (e.g., classical test theory, item response theory, additive conjoint measurement), because such transformations must not violate these constraints and so distort descriptions of studied phenomena.
Metric spaces of many dimensions, with every dimension ratio scaled, are what many researchers and methodologists have relied on as being suitable for representing scientific data and what many of us are accustomed to thinking in terms of when we think about such data. This reliance is an especially serious problem for psychological research because psychology presently has few conceptually obviously ratio-scaled (metric) descriptive dimensions (as, e.g., Weitzenhoffer, 1951; Cliff, 1996a Cliff, , 1996b Michell, 1999 Michell, , 2008 , have taken very seriously). Our merely assuming that measurements are metric (e.g., Stevens, 1968) , treating them as if they were (no matter how sophisticatedly, e.g., Agresti, 1989; Chimka & Wolfe, 2009; Cliff & Keats, 2003; Linting, Meulman, Groenen, & van der Kooij, 2007; Liu & Agresti, 2005) , or somehow forcing them to be expressed metrically by employing, for example, additive conjoint measurement (e.g., Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971; Michell, 1990) or item response theory (e.g., de Ayala, 2009; Embretson & Reise, 2000; Sijtsma & Junker, 2006) , completely ignores the definitional aspect (see, e.g., Berka, 1992; Savage & Ehrlich, 1992) of the validity of the scale properties of the dimensions on which the measurements are supposed to represent gradations (see Hornstein, 1988; Krause, 2005 Krause, , 2012 Maraun, 1998; Michell, 2008) . Therefore, it is crucial for the development and analysis of psychological measurements as meaningful data that we learn to think about them in terms of scale properties that are definitionally appropriate for the dimensions they are supposed to represent, which are properly for psychology often only ordinal, the properties of ordered categories. This requires us to (1) be clear on how definitional validity considerations logically bear upon the scale properties of measurements; (2) demonstrate that our measurements are ordinal; (3) appreciate the importance of ordinally measuring as against only ranking cases on dimensions; (4) understand the constraints on (i.e., the sometimes undecidability of) comparative distance determinations on even a single ordinally gradated dimension; (5) understand the properties of ordinal hyperspaces; (6) understand the constraints on comparative distance determinations in ordinal hyperspaces; and (7) understand how experimental intervention or treatment effects can be interpreted in ordinal hyperspace terms.
The Validity of Measurement Scales
Phenomena are described for scientific purposes in terms of qualities or dimensions that are meaningful and important. A measurement represents the instantiation in some phenomenon of a gradation on a particular descriptive dimension as a property of the phenomenon. Description is essential for all scientific research, and measurement is essential for all description.
Measurement takes account of and expresses the quantitative, which is most fundamentally the "more than, equal to, or less than" aspect of the comparative descriptions of phenomena in terms of the dimensions we take to be descriptive of these phenomena. All scientific descriptions of the phenomena of nature derive from measurements taken on these phenomena by means of the devices and operations-the measures-that produced these measurements. The validity or scientific credibility of such descriptions depends upon the validity of the measurements, which in turn logically must depend upon the validity of the measures that produced them (Krause, 2012) . Matters of quantitative likeness and unlikeness (e.g., "He is more anxious than she.") are quite distinct from matters of qualitative or nominal scale (Stevens, 1951) likeness and unlikeness ("He is anxious. She is depressed."). Quantitative unlikenesses, which compare gradations on the same dimension, are orderable. Qualitative unlikenesses, which compare different dimensions, are not orderable. Thus, the fact that there is a long mathematical tradition of considering only what maps onto the real number domain as being quantitative, for example, as Michell (1999 Michell ( , 2008 points out, is simply not a good enough reason to consider ordinal differences on a dimension to be qualitative differences. But whether they are called quantitative or qualitative, ordinal differences (i.e., those expressed exclusively in terms of pairs of rank positions or of ordered categories) on a dimension are worth taking seriously by any science that deals with such differences.
Psychological measurement is done to provide answers to quantitative questions in terms of qualitative dimensions, like "How stressful is this social situation for you?" or "How disturbed is he now?" These can usefully be answered in terms of ordinal categories; for example, "This situation is somewhat stressful for me but not intolerably or even very stressful." "He seems very disturbed but not to the extent of behaving irrationally." Questions of how much or of how much more in terms of psychological dimensions can well be answered in terms of ordered category scales, because to be most coherent with a dimension's conceptual definition, measurements must be in terms specified or implicated by this dimension's definition. In other words, whatever gradation on a dimension is indicated by a measurement, this quantitative degree of the dimension must conform to the conceptual analysis and definition of the dimension of which it is supposed to be a measurement. Therefore, the scale properties of a measurement are most fundamentally constrained by the definition, the meaning, of the concept (Michell, 2008) of this dimension. Without knowing what the conceptually precisely defined meaning of each of a set of dimensions is, and so how they are each gradated, we cannot know where measured cases are located in the abstract space specified or defined by these dimensions.
For example, Mental Health Status (MHS) is obviously a dimension of several and perhaps many levels or degrees ("How sick is this person?"), but these are not presently consensually defined in psychology as representing a continuum or having a unit measure, zero point, or specific outer bounds. Thus, what are often purported to be measurements of MHS cannot justifiably support the four arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) because together these require a zero point, a unit measure, and a continuum. And yet what presently are purported to be measurements of MHS routinely are arithmetically manipulated in one or another of these ways, as in calculating an item set's total score for estimating MHS (as is done in Classical Test Theory and also in Item Response Theory: see, e.g., Embretson & Reise, 2000, pp. 13-39) , correlating variables for estimating the convergent validity of proposed MHS measures, correlating individual item scores with item-total scores for estimating the relevance or scalability of items as elements in such total scores, and calculating t-values or effect sizes for testing or estimating treatment contrasts, none of which is permissible on nonmetric (non-ratio-scale) data.
Just having an MHS unit measure (equal interval) for a dimension would justify subtraction of one measurement value on it from another, but because simple differences are not specifically located on a dimension (i.e., they are independent of specifically where the difference occurs on the dimension), a unit measure is in itself insufficient for calculating means, variances, or correlations. Such statistics' calculation requires addition, division, and for the latter two statistics also multiplication. Having also a zero point is necessary to justify addition, multiplication, and division (which also requires continuity), because sums, products, and quotients are specifically located on a dimension; that is, they depend upon specifically where the addends, multiplicands, and dividends are absolutely located on the dimension relative to zero. So only with defined unit measures, zero points, and continuity would group means, variances, and correlations be properly calculable. However, because MHS has not yet been defined in a way that entails all these latter scale properties, valid measurements of MHS can properly be merely ordered-category measurements and nothing more. Much conceptual-analytic work obviously remains to be done for and a reasonable normative consensus achieved on the definition of this dimension (see, e.g., Krause, 2005; Krause & Lutz, 2009) , as is also the case for many other of psychology's descriptive dimensions.
Proving Ordinality
Whether one is ranking a set of cases or constructing an ordered set of categories on a dimension, a certain logical/mathematical requirement must be met if the result is properly to be taken as ordinal. This is the requirement of ordinal consistency; that is, for all cases or categories properly describable in terms of a dimension everything less than a given case or category on the dimension is less than everything greater than or equal to that case or category on the dimension (e.g., Shye, 1978) . This would be an easy requirement to satisfy if and only if every comparing and so ranking of cases (a) were of all the relevant cases or categories, (b) were reliably replicated in every proper ranking of these cases, and (c) were itself as a process explicitly governed by this very requirement so that any ranking that failed to meet it was thereby delegitimated as an adequate instance of the process. But these conditions do not in general presently hold for psychological attributes because they are ultimately matters of individual human judgment (e.g., Westen & Weinberger, 2004 , make this point particularly nicely). (a) These judgments are made on only some of the relevant persons, behaviors, experiences, or situations and these are not demonstrably representative of all such. (b) They are made on various occasions under various conditions by various raters and not uncommonly somewhat differently on each occasion and by each rater. (c) The processes by which they are made are not now generally effectively governed by the requirement of ordinal consistency. Therefore, thoroughly satisfying the requirement of ordinal consistency for all the rankings or ordinal measurings on any psychological dimension would at present be quite remarkable. There are two opposite ways to respond to this problem: the presently popular way of tolerating it by accepting rather modest item-total correlations or scalability coefficient values as sufficient (see, e.g., Sijtsma & Junker, 2006) versus reducing the number of items and so scale gradations (see, e.g., Sijtsma, 1998 , 17 on item selection). Nevertheless, ordinal consistency is of paramount importance for valid and so meaningful measurement, so any ways to promote the ordinal consistency of measurements on a dimension are important to discover.
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a simpler task than ranking many cases. Each case's assignment to one and only one category of a small set of ordered categories that themselves meet the ordinal consistency requirement on their dimension meets two of the three ordinal consistency requirements: (a) assignment to one and only one of a closed set of (c) already indisputably ordered categories. The only requirement that is not met for ordinal measurement by this approach is that of (b) consistency across raters or occasions in the assignment of any given case. Disagreement among raters or (stable case) testϪretest occasions in assigning a case to any one ordered category-that is, measurement unreliability-must often result in some ordinal inconsistencies because the case will sometimes be assigned to one and sometimes to another category. Such unreliability of measurement, however little or limited it is, entails some invalidity of measurement, because variation in the measurements on a dimension of a case itself in fact invariant on that dimension entails that some (but not which) of these measurements must be invalid (Krause, 2005 (Krause, , 2012 . Minimizing the number of ordered categories, better defining and distinguishing the categories, better instructing and rehearsing of the raters, and better preparing of the measurement situation are possible ways to approach achieving measurement reliability and so of avoiding this manifestation of measurement invalidity.
Proving the validity of a measure for a given ordinal-scale dimension (i.e., of a specific operational way of measuring on that particular dimension), and therefore of the measurements that measure produces, is obviously a more encompassing matter than proving that these measurements are reliably ordered-category scaled, but it does require proving the latter. If according to its definition the dimension is merely ordered-category scaled, then the dimension necessarily must have the following properties. (A) It is quantitative; that is, constitutes a descriptive dimension with two (such as that the quality is present or absent) or more (i.e., present to what distinct degree) ordinal gradations. (B) It has an unambiguous directionality such that less than and greater than on the dimension are clearly mutually exclusive relationships between all its ordered categories; (C) It has one consensually and normatively accepted set of ordered categories. (D) The dimension does not have a unit measure in terms of which sums, differences, products, or ratios can properly express distances between these categories. (E) The dimension may or may not have a zero-value category or an implicit zero value between two of the categories (and so have both negative and positive value gradations) or beyond an outer-bound category (and so have only negative or positive gradations).
As an illustration of this, it seems fair to say that, at present, MHS is (A) quantitative; (B) directional; (C) without a definitive ordered-category set or any upper or lower bound category; (D) without a unit-measure; and (E) without a definitive zero category or implicit zero scale location. Obviously a normative conceptual definition for determining the validity of measures of MHS does not yet exist. Therefore, the basis for even an ordered-category (let alone a ratio) scale for MHS is presently lacking, and this constitutes a chronic problem for the very heavily invested in mental health treatment effectiveness research (for a review of which see, e.g., Orlinsky, Rønnestad, & Willutzki, 2004 ; for a review of the diversity of current MHS measures see Ogles, Masters, & Lambert, 1996 ; for some discussion of the problem this creates see Krause & Lutz, 2009 ). Similar problems, of course, exist elsewhere.
Rankings Versus Measurements
The rankings on a dimension of one sample of cases provides no basis for comparing these cases to the rankings on that dimension of another sample of cases, which can only be done by ranking the cases from the two samples again after having combined them together into one sample. This is so because there is no way to express rankings in terms of specific gradations or locations on the dimension in terms of which they are ranked. Thus, there is no way to definitively locate a case (i.e., specify its coordinates) in an ordinal hyperspace on the basis of rankings within nonexhaustive samples of the relevant population of cases. (Given an exhaustive sample of cases, however, their rankings themselves could serve as ordered categories).
Measurements on a dimension, however, do provide a basis for comparing cases both within and between samples of cases in terms of this dimension, because they represent specific gradations or locations on the dimension. Therefore the categories on orderedcategory scaled dimensions produce sample-independent ordinal locations on these dimensions, because each ordered-category on such a scale represents a specific ordinal location or value on that dimension, and so every distinguishable location in a hyperspace defined by a set of ordinal-scale dimensions has its unique configuration of ordinal coordinate values. Valid measurements on a dimension are unbiased by influences peculiar to the specific sample of cases measured or circumstances of their measuring, which means that each case is measured in the same valid way independently of all others.
Given a dimension in terms of which to rank or ordinally measure cases, ranking is case-sample based, whereas measuring is dimension-gradation based. Thus, each case can, in principle, be definitively located in an ordinal hyperspace on the basis of measurements of that particular case on each of the space's dimensions, whereas it cannot be definitively located in the space on the basis of this case's rankings on the space's dimensions in any (nonexhaustive) sample of cases. Certainly for basic science purposes measuring is preferable to ranking.
Raters who presumably understand a given psychological dimension d do the measuring of cases on d. However, all who do such might not have precisely the same understanding of d or be as diligent in their rating, and so because of this may produce somewhat different measurements on d for any given sample of cases. This would be manifested as unreliability in the measurement assigned to a case across raters, which results in ordinal inconsistencies between different raters' measurements of these cases so that a case higher than another on the dimension according to one rater is lower than or tied with it according to another rater. What, then, ought to be made of and so done about such unreliability and inconsistencies?
Because measurement validity based on raters' diligence and common understanding of each descriptive dimension d crucially matters, the way to deal with inconsistencies between raters' measurements must be through ensuring raters' diligence and achieving their common understanding of d consistent with its normative conceptual definition. Coefficients that express the degree or extent of inconsistencies serve no useful purpose beyond This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
indicating whether or not there are such inconsistencies, and nothing beyond the simple acknowledgment that there are is therefore needed. Reliability coefficients statistically significantly greater than zero are not in the least reassuring, and even their being insignificantly less-but in fact less-than 1 would be insufficiently reassuring. Psychology should squarely face, rather than try to statistically finesse, its measurement unreliability and so validity issues no matter how difficult it may be to actually resolve them, because as a basic science and public enterprise it is about individual persons' lives, single cases, rather than about any averages. Any inconsistency among measurements of the same thing on a dimension is evidence of some rater's inadequate understanding of this dimension. When raters do not agree on a measurement, then they must analyze why they do not in order to reach an agreement or to inform and stimulate the further conceptual analysis and better definition of the dimension. It is not scientifically helpful to gloss over inconsistencies by expressing them in terms of some quantitative coefficient of measurement unreliability or invalidity and simply leave the matter there, as is now commonly done. The terms of understanding a dimension or the skill at rating on it may differ among raters, but however they differ it indicates that the conceptual analysis of that dimension or the training of raters has to be pressed farther before their ratings can properly be at all relied upon. Glossing measurement unreliability as random error merely impedes the progress of scientific psychology.
Comparing across the measurements on each case in a sample of cases is, obviously, how we discover inconsistencies between raters. The comparison of a pair of raters' orderings of the same set of cases can most graphically be conceived and compared by making two parallel ordered listings of the cases and drawing straight same-case connecting lines from one ordering to another. The number of crossings of these lines is a measure of the degree of inconsistency between these two raters: minimum (zero) crossings for perfectly consistent orderings, maximum crossings for perfectly opposite orderings. Consideration of a best numerical expression for inconsistencies between two orderings of the same sample of cases (see, e.g., Cliff, 1996b, pp. 29 -54 ) is unnecessary, because how to express numerically the extent of inconsistencies is quite beside the point when measurement validity is at issue, as it is here. This is so because no extent of inconsistencies beyond none is ultimately scientifically tolerable. Every inconsistency indicates an invalidity of measurement (but, of course, consistency does not per se indicate validity, because it can be due to shared invalidity). Now we are ready to consider the implications of cases being represented by merely ordinal measurements, first on a single dimension in order to establish some basic notions and then in an ordinal hyperspace to better appreciate the severe constraints that ordered-category measurement imposes upon multivariate data analysis while still allowing such analysis.
Comparative Distance on a Single Ordinal-Scale Dimension
Given a set of ordered-categories on a single dimension, it is possible to order the lengths of all paths along that dimension which contain or are contained in each other and only these paths. In one-dimensional spaces paths that have either a common origin or a common destination meet this requirement or both the origin and the destination of one lying within the bounds of those of the other. It is the specificity of each category's ordinal location on the scale of its dimension that allows this ordering of path lengths or distances as longer than, equal to, or shorter than one another. If a set of ordered-categories is, from its lower to its upper extremum: A, B, C, D, E, then, for example, the paths ABCDE (ϭ in length to EDCBA), ABCD (ϭ DCBA), ABC (ϭ CBA), AB (ϭ BA), and A (which is of zero length) are successively shorter paths. Those before each equal sign here being (from left to right) in an upward direction and those after each equal sign being (from left to right) in a downward direction. The complete containment of one path in another makes the two orderable in length: each one being either Ͼ or Ͻ or ϭ each other.
Without such containment of one entirely in the other, two ordered-category paths are simply incomparable in length and so undecidable as to relative length. For example, the pairs of paths or distances AB and ED, CD and CB, ABC and CD, CBA and DCB, ABCD and BCDE are each incomparable because neither path of each of these pairs of paths contains the other. This incomparability is the fundamental problem of ordinal measurement, because such measurement lacks a unit measure whereby the length of every path on a given dimension can be expressed as some fraction of every other, and so the relative lengths of many of the possible pairs of paths on a merely ordinally gradated dimension will be undecidable. Because incomparability and so undecidability are obviously not the same as equality, it is logically unjustifiable to treat them as if they were tantamount to equality.
The transitivity of ordinal length holds for all paths, Ps, that are successively contained or nested within (ʚ) one another, so that each is less than or equal to, Յ, in length all those that contain it. Thus, P 1 ʚ P 2 ʚ P 3 entails that P 1 Յ P 2 Յ P 3 . However, if there are two pairs of paths (P 1 and P 2 ) each contained in a different longer path (P 1 = and P 2 = , respectively) both of which are contained in the same still longer path: P 3 ϭ ABCD, such that (P 1 ϭ AB) ʚ (ABC ϭ P 2 ) and (P 1 = ϭ CD) ʚ (BCD ϭ P 2 = ), then even though these are all contained in P 3 ϭ ABCD nothing can be inferred here about the relative lengths of the pair of paths P 1 and P 2 or of the pair of paths P 1 = and P 2 = . Neither of the shortest paths here contains the other, nor do either of the next longer paths contain the other, although all four are contained in the longest path. All that is determinable here is that P 1 Ͻ P 2 , P 1 = Ͻ P 2 = , and all of these are Ͻ P 3 . This illustrates the undecidability of relative length and distance determinations when there is no unit measure.
The requirement of containment for comparability of path lengths is generalizable to sets larger than pairs, because the latter can always be resolved into all their different subsets of pairs. Perhaps an example would be useful here, especially because for the ordered category data that actually constitute much of psychology's data, the logical constraints on data analysis of merely ordinal data are quite severe. Given a set of n patients treated uniformly and an ordered-category outcome variable, the pre-topost results of a treatment experiment involving these patients would be a set of n ordered-category transits. The most clinically informative way to report these results is as just this set of changes, which shows what destination on the outcome variable each patient with each origin on this variable reaches (see Krause, 2011; Krause, Howard, & Lutz, 1998) . This allows judgments about whether or not to apply this treatment to particular subsequent patients to be made (in part) according to these patients' origins on the outcome variable (i.e., as a covariate), which is advantageous insofar as particular origins tend to be associated with particular destinations (, e.g., if the most sick not only can be but, in fact, do tend to be the most improved), something that an average destination or change score (which could with ordered-category data be a mode, perhaps a median, but not a mean) for a set of patients with various origins does not show. The ordering by ordinal length of the change paths from a common origin, with the set of upward paths (improvements) all contained in the longest of them (and similarly for the downward paths), allows for a useful analysis of ordered-category outcome data. The more nearly one-to-one the change-paths map from a given origin to their destinations (which is analogous to "the less variance around the mean outcome" for metric variables), the less ambiguous the implications for subsequent patients (Krause, 2011) . The more nearly uniformly and maximally positive the destinations from a particular origin, the more promising on the basis of this evidence will this treatment be for subsequent patients with that origin.
A most telling and feasible use of such destination category distributions for each origin category is the making of comparisons across treatments (see Krause & Lutz, 2009; Krause, Lutz, & Boehnke, 2011) . For each origin and treatment there is an observed relative frequency of each upward and each downward change, and these provide a basis for preferring one treatment over another for patients at each specific origin. Just how this is done depends upon one's decision criterion; for example, select a treatment for its minimum expectable loss, maximum expectable gain, maximum expectable modal or median gain, minimum expectable modal or median loss, and various conjunctions of these. It is obviously tempting to ignore the fact that one's data are merely ordered-category scale measurements and so to ignore that one's comparisons of cases are limited by the mathematical properties of mere ordinality. It is so tempting that it is commonplace in psychological research: for example, taking rating scale numerical anchors as real (i.e., ratio-scale) rather than ordinal numbers; taking each of a set of pass-fail (1,0) test items as legitimately representable by a common unit measure on a common dimension (i.e., passing any one is equivalent to passing any other, as is assumed in Classical Test Theory and initially in Item Response Theory, e.g., Embretson & Reise, 2000, pp. 187-225; Sijtsma & Junker, 2006) , assigning to each pass-fail item of a set of such items a real number score (on a presumed common dimension) corresponding to the fraction of some sample of persons who passed it or to this fraction transformed by a logistic function; interpreting numerical rank designations as real numbers (e.g., as proposed by Kendall, 1955, pp. 1-18) . Such practices are at least in part a legacy of S. S. Stevens' (1951) operationalism (Michell, 1999, pp. 162-190) . But they are also undoubtedly motivated by their wonderful convenience for Linear Model data analysis in a social context in which rather few seem bothered by the mathematical unjustifiability of the practice (see Krause, 2010; Michell, 2008) . All data analyses deriving from this practice applied to what are essentially ordinal data can only be suppositious and tentative unless and until they are corroborated by proper analyses of the same data in terms of their strictly ordinal properties.
Introduction to Ordinal Hyperspaces
The only mathematically justifiable way to compare path lengths or distances in a multivariate ordinal space is in terms of ordinally comparative subpath lengths on a common path, which was the notion introduced above for one-dimensional ordinal spaces. The least distant neighbors of a point on any single ordinally gradated dimension are the two adjacent points, one just greater than and the other just less than the given point on that dimension (if this point is not itself an extremum on that dimension and so has only one nearest neighbor on that dimension). In an ordinal hyperspace, however, there are degrees of adjacency, and "most adjacent" means that two points are identical on all dimensions but one and adjacent on that one and "least adjacent" (but still adjacent) means that two points are identical on no dimension but adjacent on all. However, degree of adjacency to given point cannot be a measure of distance from it in an ordinal hyperspace, because there can be many different points that have the same degree of adjacency to a given point but are not comparable in terms of the path inclusion or containment rule since they are each on a different path from that central point and distance in an ordinal hyperspace is only meaningful in terms of path inclusion. Perhaps a brief example would be useful for clarifying the notion of adjacency: Given 3 dimensions and 3 gradations on each, the least adjacent points with the point having the ordinal coordinates 222 are the points with the coordinates 111 and 333; the points of intermediate adjacency with point 222 are points 112, 121, 211, 332, 323, 233 ; the most adjacent points with point 222 are 122, 212, 221, 322, 232, 223. A transit or path in an ordinal hyperspace is any series of points in that space. On any such path there is one next-farther-along point and one next-less-far-along point for any given (nonboundary) point of that path. These points may be to some degree adjacent to the given point or they may not be adjacent at all. The degree of "continuity" of a path can vary along the course of that path and can be anything from the highest degree of adjacency to a leap from one extremum on all dimensions to the opposite extremum on all, that is, from sequentially involving the maximum possible number of most highly adjacent points to involving only two points which span the whole space. Since ordinal distance is path-dependent, since there are increasingly many paths possible across increasingly large regions of an ordinal hyperspace, and since there is no analogue of a straight line or shortest distance between any two nonadjacent points in an ordinal hyperspace (again, degree of adjacency is not a measure of distance), points do not have single real-number-domain distances that minimally separate them in ordinal hyperspaces. Therefore, such real-numberdomain distance is not a meaningful concept in ordinal hyperspace. Instead, comparative or relative distance on a given path (and so distance from a given point on any given path that originates or terminates at that point) is the concept in ordinal hyperspace most analogous to that of distance in Euclidean hyperspace.
The concepts of points, distances between points, paths connecting points, regions, and neighborhoods require definition in terms of ordinal hyperspaces if we are to be properly able to pursue our research objectives with data that has only ordered-category scale properties. These five concepts as expressed in ordinal terms are interdependent. Points are ordinal locations expressed as a (uniformly ordered) set of m ordered-category-scale coordinates in an m-dimensional space, that is, as an m-tuple. A path is any sequence of points. Comparative distances between points are always "ordinal lengths" of the paths connecting them, such that on each of two paths in an ordinal space which are possible to compare (i.e., are ordinally commensurable) one must contain or be contained by the other if their relative lengths are to be determinable (as shall be explained further below). Every region in an m pace is bounded and defined by 2m points consisting of that region's upper bound and lower bound on each dimension, and so it constitutes an at most m-dimensional figure in this m space. A neighborhood is a compact region around some given central point in that region, and so a neighborhood is always relative to some given point. Compact here means that every point in a neighborhood (other than the neighborhood's outer boundary points) has only other points in that neighborhood as its most highly adjacent (nearest) neighbors.
The ordinal neighborhood of any given point consists of that point's adjacents (i.e., those points that are in some degree adjacent to it) and of the further adjacents of these initial adjacents, and so forth up to whatever size one chooses within the limits of the given number of ordered categories k on each dimension and the number of dimensions m of the hyperspace. The size of a neighborhood or of any region in an ordinal hyperspace can be expressed in terms of its ordinal outer-boundary points, which altogether also define its location. (The size of a neighborhood or region can also be expressed in terms of its cardinal volume as defined by the sum of the number of points in it, but which does not define its location.) Concentric neighborhoods (i.e., those around the same central point) of progressively larger size in terms of their outer boundaries involve some boundary points progressively more distant from the given center and none less distant. All of these notions apply to any description of anything, as much to "qualitative" as to "quantitative" research, and so to all comparisons of persons, how they live their lives, their situations, behaviors, experiencings.
Distance in Ordinal Hyperspace
In an ordinal hyperspace the relative ordinal distance of two points from a central point can be clear only if one point has higher ordinal values on at least one dimension and no lower values on any other dimension than does the other point. This is so because, as shown above, the only admissible notion of distance in an ordinal hyperspace between two points is in terms of longer and shorter paths within a given set of successively containing or contained paths. Thus, a second point must be farther than is a first point from an origin point (1) if and only if the second point lies on an extension of a path (where the extension's origin is the destination of the original path) from the origin point to the first point, and this requires that (2) the extension (to the second point) does not have a destination less far along on any dimension than the (first) point it is an extension from. Any path extended from a first point to a second point that meets this test is necessarily longer than any path from the origin to the first point, since it is an extension of any and all of the alternative paths to the first point, all of which have both a common origin and a common destination even if none of which contains or is contained by any other.
It is necessary for comparing ordinal distances to have a decidability rule for relative distance that was independent of specific paths in ordinal hyperspace. So, consider a first point that is (a) less separated (by intervening ordered categories) from an origin point on some dimensions than is some second point, (b) equal on some dimensions with the second point, and (c) more separated on some dimensions than the second point. These conditions (a), (b), (c) and their negations set the stage for defining a rule for distance comparisons in ordinal hyperspaces analogous to that for vector length in Euclidian spaces. The symbol ϳ will be used subsequently to mean "not." Two destination points may be (a) less separated on some dimensions or (ϳa) not less separated on any from their common origin point, (b) equal on some dimensions or (ϳb) not equal on any with their common origin point, and (c) more separated on some dimensions or (ϳc) not more separated on any from their common origin point. This creates 2 3 ϭ 8 possible distinct comparisons of separation from a common origin point.
How much separated on each dimension are each of two destination points separated from a common origin point is not translatable for ordinal hyperspaces into some numerical net difference in separation for two reasons: The path containment rule for comparability (discussed above) severely limits the sets of paths that are comparable in ordinal hyperspaces and there is no mathematically justifiable way to convert merely ordinal numbers on one dimension into those of another dimension without arbitrarily interjecting some common unit-measure. To simply arbitrarily assign real numbers that are ordinally consistent with an ordering, as in interpreting rank positions as if they were real numbers (as Kendall, 1955, pp. 1-18 , did and others continue to do), is such an arbitrary interjection. Any number assignment strictly true to an ordering has all and only the properties of that ordering, and imbuing it with any excess meaning (such as having a unitmeasure) gratuitously imputes specious properties to that ordering and so to what it orders (see Weitzenhoffer, 1951) .
1. (abc) is undecidable as to the two destination points being equal or different in separability from their common origin point, because the one destination point being (a) less separated on some dimensions, (c) more separated on others, and (b) equally separated on the rest than the other destination point makes which is more distant from their common origin point undecidable.
2. (abϳc) is decidable, because the one destination point being (a) less separated on some dimensions, (b) equally separated on some, and (ϳc) not more separated on any from their common origin point than the other destination point entails that the former is less distant than the latter from their common origin point.
3. (aϳbc) is undecidable, because the one destination point being (a) less separated on some dimensions, (b) not equally separated on any, and (c) more separated on some than the other from their common origin point makes their relative distance from this origin point undecidable.
4. (ϳabc) is decidable, because the one destination point being (ϳa) not less separated on any dimensions, (b) equally separated on some, and (c) more separated on some from their common origin point than is the other destination point entails that the former destination point is more distant from their common origin point than the latter destination point.
5. (aϳbϳc) is decidable, because the one destination point being (a) less separated on some dimensions, (ϳb) not equally separated on any, and (ϳc) not more separated on any from their common origin point than the other destination point entails that the former destination point is less distant from their common origin point than the latter destination point. 6. (ϳaϳbc) is decidable, because the one destination point being (ϳa) not less separated on any dimensions, (ϳb) not equally separated on any, and (c) more separated on some from their common origin point entails that the former destination point is more distant from their common origin point than is the latter destination point.
7. (ϳabϳc) is decidable, because the one destination point being (ϳa) not less separated on any dimensions, (b) equally separated on some, and (ϳc) not more separated on any from their common origin point than the other destination point entails that the two destination points are equally distant from their common origin point.
8. (ϳaϳbϳc) is logically impossible, because one destination point cannot possibly be conjointly (ϳa) not less separated on any dimensions, (ϳb) not equally separated on any, and (ϳc) not more separated on any from their common origin point than is another destination point.
Making the three decisions as to whether (a) or (ϳa), (b) or (ϳb), and (c) or (ϳc) is the case constitutes applying a Relative Ordinal Distance Decidability Rule (RODDR) for ordinal hyperspaces. Perhaps a small contrived example would be helpful here for seeing how RODDR works. Assume that instead of a single Mental Health Status dimension there are three dimensions (perhaps irrational distress, personality disintegration, and irrational disability Krause, 2005) , each having three ordinal levels (with level 1 healthiest and level 3 sickest on each), and that we want to know if a particular patient has improved overall in Mental Health Status from before to after his course of treatment. If he began treatment at 322 and ended treatment at 111, 211, 221, 212, 122, 112, 121, 222, 312, 321, or 331, 313, 232, 223, 233, 132, 123, or 133 are all undecidable as to overall improvement or deterioration according to RODDR, because there is no way to translate any amount of change on one dimension into some amount of change on another. Any other way of dealing with ordinal data (e.g., involving operations such as the adding or averaging involved in Classical Test Theory's or Item Response Theory's conversion of item or subtest scores into latent variable values: e.g., Embretson & Reise, 2000, pp. 13-39) that produces results at all discrepant from these distorts the data by in effect arbitrarily introducing additional information into them that makes the transformed data invalid for locating persons in the given hyperspace.
Treatment Effectiveness and Reliability Comparisons in Ordinal Hyperspace
The location of a region in an ordinal hyperspace is defined by its outer boundaries, and so in an m dimensional hyperspace this must be indicated by 2m numbers. Its size is defined by the volume of this location and so by the number of points in the region. The distance between two regions is the distance between the closest of their outer boundary points of all those of the m dimensions if the regions do not overlap. If the regions do overlap on any dimension, the distance between them is zero, and their amount of overlap is the volume of their overlap, the size of their common sub region, the number of points in this sub region.
If treatments are being compared in terms of their effectiveness on several merely ordinally gradated outcome dimensions, the distance between these treatments' outcome distributions (and therefore regions) in this hyperspace represents the minimum difference (as against the more familiar average difference) in their effectiveness. Insofar as these regions overlap, the treatments' comparative effectiveness is to that extent ambiguous for future patients (which extends the argument made in Krause, 2011 , beyond one dimension and to merely ordinal outcome variables). The volume of each treatment's outcome region represents that treatment's unreliability, that is, the variation in outcomes obtained with that treatment. Ideally a new treatment would be markedly and consistently superior to a standard or control treatment and completely reliable, so it would have an outcome distribution that defined a region maximally favorably distant from and not at all overlapping with that of a baseline treatment (Krause & Lutz, 2009 ) on all m dimensions. Also it would be a region of single point volume, because its outcome would be reliably precise and so precisely predictable. Thus, treatment outcome comparisons and all descriptive comparisons are as feasible in ordinal as in Euclidian outcome spaces. So merely ordinal-scale measurements ought not be simply presumed to be the same as, or to have to be mathematically unjustifiably warped into, ratio-scale numbers in order to be usefully analyzed.
Conclusion
Much psychological data, whether we call it quantitative or qualitative, properly ought to and can usefully be dealt with as simply ordinal rather than metric. When and only when ordinal data is analyzed strictly as such will it be possible to judge how much if any distortion is introduced by any method of metricizing ordinal data (e.g., as discussed in Liu & Agresti, 2005) . Such judgments can be made by comparing the results of the analysis of the metricized data (e.g., Item Response Theory) with the results of the strictly ordinal analysis of the original ordinal data.
The purpose of this paper has been to clarify the nature of ordinal hyperspaces in terms of the concepts of locations or points in them, adjacency of such points, distances or paths between points, neighborhoods and regions in ordinal hyperspaces, and such regions' locations, sizes or volumes, and overlaps. These concepts must do the work in ordinal spaces that is done by the parameters or moments of univariate and multivariate statistical distributions in uniformly metric spaces (often achieved by standard scoring variables, which does somewhat distort such distributions). Ordinal hyperspace concepts should be familiar to all those who properly must deal with merely ordinally gradated dimensions for describing the phenomena they study, as is the case for psychotherapy research, like most human psychology research. Those who prefer "qualitative" over "quantitative" research most fundamentally do so because the scale properties of the descriptive dimensions they rely on are naturally ordinal, which logically constrains data analysis so that Linear Model or Structural Equation Model methods are not applicable because these require ratio-scale dependent-variable data. There are also logical constraints on the analysis of the multivariate ordinal-scale data that is This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
naturally often produced by psychological research, and it is these constraints that are the central concern of this paper.
